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Introduction. 
The fulfillment of the Law of One Price (LOP) or the absence of arbitrage opportunities in financial 
markets may be characterized by the existence of state prices with appropriate properties (Ingersoll 
(1987) or Chamberlain and Rothschild(19S:3)). Ch en and Knez (1995) characterize the absence of 
arbitrage opportunities among different financial markets by means of the vanishing of a certain 
integration measure. Furthermore, their measure has the important property of not depending 
on the dynamic assumptions applied to price assets. In their empirical analysis of the markets 
NYSE and NASDAQ , they compute that, based on the data, the two markets seem to violate the 
strong-form integration (i.e., cross-market arbitrage may be possible). They also check that the 
measure depends crucially on the frictionless market assumption and consequently they suggest the 
convenience of extending their discussion to economies with trading frictions and transaction costs. 
When the LOP is characterized by the existence of state prices, we may only know whether the 
LOP holds or does not hold. We follow Chen and Knez(1995)'s idea of introducing a measure to 
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characterize the fulfillment of the LOP. This represented a breakthrough in quantifying pricing dis-
crepancy between markets. The measure we define tries to avoid some of the problems encountered 
when using the measure proposed by Chen and Knez(1995). First, it is not necessary to deal with 
more than one market. Second, our measure also vanishes if and only if the LOP holds, and can be 
positive and small enough whenever the market is very close to the LOP. This makes the models 
much more flexible and useful in practical situations, since they are less sensitive to measurement 
errors. Furthermore, they can accurately predict whether the nonfulfillment of the LOP is due to 
market frictions. 
The present paper analyzes first the level of fulfillment of the LOP in a single financial market. 
Like Chen and Knez (1995), we introduce a measure that does not depend on the dynamic applied 
to price the assets. Nevertheless, our measure is different from theirs, since ours tests the total 
amount of money an investor can win when the LOP does not hold. It is well known that any 
portfolio can be replicated with arbitrary price if the LOP fails. Therefore, we must look for relative 
measures if we are interested in measuring the level of fulfillment of the LOP in monetary terms. 
Thus we compute how much money an investor can win from an arbitrage portfolio with respect 
to the total price of all the exchanged (sold or purchased) assets. 
Many empirical papers test the efficiency of financial markets, or even some well-known arbitrage 
strategies, usually concluding that these strategies could be implemented if the transaction costs 
\vere small enough, (Hudson, Dempsey and Keasey (1996) or Kamara and Miller (1995)). The 
measure we introduce below analyzes the market globally, since we are looking for all the possible 
ways of replicating portfolios to obtain monetary profits, and therefore it does not only take into 
account specific strategies. Furthermore, when we compute the measure, (the maximum relative 
profit), we can discount the transaction costs and guarantee if there still are arbitrage opportunities. 
This is not possible when the LOP is characterized by the existence of state prices, unless the 
frictions are assumed to be linear. Hence, the theory we develop here could be considered an 
alternative to the results of Prisman(1986) for a market with frictions. 
As already said, the measure we propose gives the quotient between the total amount of money 
an agent can win and the price of the assets he/she has to exchange to replicate his/her portfolios. 
From a mathematical point of view, this measure is obtained from solving the optimization program 
(10). However, it is not easy to study this program since some of the constraints in (10) are given 
by strict inequalities. Hence, the existence of a solution to (10) is not guaranteed. Furthermore, 
even assuming the existence of a solution, the usual analytic techniques for solving (10) do not 
apply. since the objective is a non-differentiable function. 
To avoid these difficulties, we organize the paper as follows. The first section is devoted to 
present the basic assumptions, the notations and some classic and important results which will 
frequently be applied. The measure of the degree of fulfillment of the LOP is introduced in the 
second section. To do it, we begin by assuming that each agent holds a portfolio given by a vector 
h = (hI' h2 ••• ·hn ) (which depends on the agent) such that hi 2: 0, where hi is the number of units 
on the i-th asset. We also assume that the agents cannot replicate their portfolios by selling more 
than hi units in each asset i (an agent cannot sell what he/she does not have). Then program (lh) 
gives us the best way for each agent to replicate his/her portfolio. By solving this progra~ we 
introduce the function 4>(h), which is identically zero if and only if the LOP holds. The fact that 4> 
is a homogeneous function of degree one guarantees that program (5) leads to the maximum profit 
an investor can obtain by replicating the portfolios h relative to the price of h. The optimal value 
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of this program, which, again, vanishes if and only if the LOP holds, will be our measure m of the 
degree of fulfillment of the LOP. 
The third section is devoted to prove a Saddle Point Theorem (Theorem 8), which will be useful 
to compute the measure m, the portfolio h* solution of (5) and the portfolio x* solution of (lh o ). 
We also show some intuitive interpretations of the Saddle Point Theorem. 
Short-selling restrictions disappear in the fourth section: we allow the investors to hold initial 
portfolios h with short positions in each asset. We also assume there is no limit on the short-selling 
restrictions that can be taken to replicate portfolios. Under these assumptions, we prove Theorem 
11, one of the most important results of the present paper, since it guarantees that after absolutely 
relaxing the restrictions imposed to the short positions, we obtain the same value for the level of 
fulfillment (or violation) of the LOP. Hence, m is also the optimal value of program (8), that is, 
the maximum quotient between the profit an agent can win by replicating (without restrictions) 
his/her arbitrary portfolio and the price of the sold assets. Furthermore, the best way to replicate 
is still given by the portfolio x* already computed. If we are interested in measuring the profit 
relative to the price of the exchanged assets, Theorem 12 shows that x* is again the best way 
to replicate any portfolio. In fact, it is enough to substitute m by 1 = 2~m to obtain the optimal 
value of the relation we are interested in. As we show in this section, both measures m and I have 
similar properties. 
Note that the ideas in the fourth section have important consequences, which are far from evi-
dent: although in Section 2 we imposed short-selling restrictions to avoid mathematical difficulties, 
our results in Section 4 show that the measures m and 1 do not depend on these restrictions. From 
the most constrained conditions (no initial short positions are permitted, and the agents cannot 
sell what they do not have) to the most relaxed ones ( no limit on the short positions of the initial 
portfolio h to be replicated, and no limit on the number of assets to be sold) we obtain the same 
measure m and the same optimal portfolio x* to implement the arbitrage. In the first case not all 
the investors can win the maximum relative profits given by m (an agent needs an initial portfolio 
proportional to h*), while in the second case this level of maximum relative profit is available to any 
agent. Of course, we would obtain the same values for m, I and x* if we worked under assumptions 
not so restrictive or not so relaxed. 
In the fifth section, we measure the degree of integration of two or more financial markets. To 
do it, we work in a global market which contains all the assets of the different ones, and we compute 
m on this global market as a measure of their integration. This represents an alternative to the 
results in Ch en and Knez(1995), where they measure how the markets jointly verify this law by 
corn pu ting the distances among the families of state prices of each market. However, in our work we 
do not need to impose the assumption that the LOP holds separately on each market. Theorem 13 
shows that our measure is continuous with respect to the Chen and Knez(1995} measure (hereafter 
denoted by g). Therefore, controlling the latter we also control the first. The opposite is false in 
general: for instance, m can take small values while 9 remains constant. Two simple examples 
illustrate this fact and show that 9 is not always sensitive to the profits the investors can win 
due to violation of the LOP across the two markets. Their measure, in both examples, remains 
constant in cases when the LOP fails, which means a serious continuity problem. This also makes 
the measure very sensitive with respect to eventual errors committed in the measurement process. 
These difficulties disappear when working with the measure m, as we show after the examples. The 
first example also illustrates that assuming that the markets do not strictly verify the LOP, the 
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way in which each market is divided into sub-markets has a strong effect on the final value of g, 
while again m and 1 avoid these problems. 
The last section summarizes the most important conclusions of this paper. All our results are 
focused on studying the degree of fulfillment (or violation) of the LOP in a financial market or 
among different ones, but an analogous analysis may be extended to measure the level of arbitrage 
opportunities (in the strong form). To do this, we only have to change the equality constraint by 
an inequality, namely, 
n n 
L Xiai(k) = 0 by L Xiai(k) ~ O. 
i=l i=l 
1 Preliminaries 
Consider an economy endowed with a Hausdorff compact topological space K, on which the linear 
space C(K) of all continuous functions over IR is defined. When equipped with the norm lIall = 
sup{la(k)1 I k E K} for any a E C(K), the space M(K) of Radon measures over K is known 
to be the dual space of C(K) (Riesz representation Theorem). Here we are assuming that K is 
the set of outcome states and for some a E C(K), a(k) represents the payoff of a portfolio in the 
state of nature k for every k E K. This restriction to continuous contingent claims is made for 
expositional and mathematical ease. In many papers (Harrison and Kreps(1979), Chamberlain 
amd Rothschild(1983),Chen and Knez (1995)·· .), Hilbert space methods are used to represent 
pricing functions and to characterize the absence of arbitrage across a market. Thus, much of their 
analysis leads them to consider an economy endowed with a probability space on which the space 
of all square-integrable functions is defined. In dealing with a finite number of states of nature 
both models coincide with the classical theory, and in most other cases it is possible to deduce one 
model from the other. 
Let the number of assets be finite and indexed by {I", .n}. The current prices of the assets are 
P = (PI, P2, .. " Pn), and the total payoff on the ith asset is ai E C (K). We denote such a market 
by M p,a where P = (PI, P2, ... ,Pn) and a = (aI, a2, .. " an), and we assume that Pi > 0 for every 
i E I and adk) > 0 for every k E K. For a portfolio x = (Xl, X2,"', xn) E IRn, the sum L:i=l Xiai 
is its total payoff and L:~I XiPi is its current price. 
Definition 1 The law of one price (LOP) holds on the market Mp,a if any two portfolios generating 
the same future payoff have the same price. 
The following result is adopted from Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983). 
Lemma 2 The LOP holds on the market Mp,a if and only if there exists Jl E M(K) such that 
IK ai dJL = Pi for every i = 1,·· ·n. 
2 Measurelllent of the degree of fulfillment of the LOP. 
In order to define a measure indicating the degree of fulfillment (or violation) of the LOP accross 





(lh) { n LXiai(k) = 0 for every k E K subject to i=l X· > -h' i = 1,"'n t _ t 
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The problem (lh) describes the process of identifying the portfolio (constrained by the bounds in 
a short position hi ~ 0) which minimizes the initial investment needed to purchase a portfolio that 
generates a zero payoff in every state of nature. Thus, a solution to the problem (lh) represents 
the maximum profit obtained by an agent replicating his/her portfolio in such a way that he/she 
cannot sell more than hi units in each asset i. When the LOP holds on the market., the optimal 
value in (1 h) is obviously zero. 
Lemma 3 (lh) is solvable for every h E IRi.. 
The proof of the above lemma relies on the fact that if the maximum is achieved for some feasible 
x* = (xi," ·,x~) then 
(2) X *. < -'.i¥-=-i__ (3 r - = i lor every J 
J - Pi 





(3h) { n :~:::>iai{k) = 0 for every k E K subject to i=1 (3. > X· > -h' i = 1, ···n I _ I _ I 
The feasible set of (3h) is non void and compact. Hence, there exists an optimal solution to (3h) 
and, consequently, to (lh). 
Denote by Fh the feasible set of (lh) and by <I>(h) the optimal value in (lh) , that is, 
n 
<I>(h) = max{- LXiPi I x E Ph}. 
i=1 
It is easily verified that 
<I>(h + h') ~ <I>{h) + <I>{h' ) and <I>(ah) = a<l>(h) 
for every h, h' E IRi. and a > 0, so <I> is a concave function. In order to prove that <I> is continuous, 
we introduce the dual problem for (lh): 
n 
Minimize L hi Ai 
subject to '{'=l 1 ai dJ.l + Ai = Pi 
J.l ~ M(I{), Ai ~ 0 for every i = 1,," n 
Lemma 4 There is strong duality for (lh) (i.e.,(lh) and (4h) are both solvable and there is no 
duality gap for (lh) and (4h))' 
The above lemma is the key to prove the following result. 
Lemma 5 <I> is the minimum of some finite number of linear functions. Therefore <I> is a continous 
piecewise linear function in 1Ri.. 
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\Ve can now define a measure as the maximum profit obtained by an investor among all the 
priced one portfolios h of the bounds in a short position. In these terms the problem is to find 
h = (hI,·· .hn ) E IRn so as to 
Maximize 4>(h) 
{ n (5) subject to LhiPi = 1 i=l h· > 0 i = 1,···n 1_
Since the feasible set 
is compact and 4> is continuous, the maximum is achieved for some h* EH. This leads to the 
following definition. 
Definition 6 For a market A1 p,Q satisfying Pi > 0, i = 1,· .. nand 0'1 (k) > 0 for every k E [( the 
disagreement measure is given by 
m = <jJ(h*) = maxi 4>(h) I h EH}. 
One can check that, with this definition, m verifies the first requirement to be a measure of non 
fulfillment of the LOP: 
Theorem 7 The LOP holds on the market A1 p ,Q if and only if m = o. 
The requirement of the LOP is thus made testable by estimating m directly. The lower the value 
of m, the closer the market is to the LOP (i.e., the lower the maximum quotient between the profit 
and the total price of short-selling restrictions.) 
As we will see in Section 5, such a test is also valid for a measurement of market integration: for 
two or more not perfectly integrated markets (i.e., markets which do not assign the same price 
to the same future payoff) treated as parts of one combined market, m also indicates the degree 
of market integration. It is important to point out that m does not depend on the way in which 
the combined market is divided into smaller groups so that the LOP holds on each one. Only the 
resultant combined market matters. 
3 A saddle point characterization. 
Suppose now that the maximum is achieved for h* E H and let x* E Fh o such that 
n 
(6) m = 4>(h*) = - L XiPi 
i=l 
From xi 2: -hi one obtains that 
n n 





The measure m only depends on the current prices Pi and on the prices over the states of nature 
0:'. We denote it by mp,a when prices are not fixed. It is easy to check that mp,ka = mp,a for every 
k > 0, so the disagreement measure is current prices relative. 
Lemma 4 ensures that <I>(h), the optimal value of (lh), can be obtained by solving (4h), that is, 
where 
A={,\EIR+ I LO:idP+'\i=Pi, i=l,···n, PEM([()}. 
Hence, the problem of finding m can be expressed by a max-min problem 
n 
m = maxmin U('\, h), hEH AEA 
where U is defined by U('\, h) = L hi'\i. 
i=l 
Theorem 8 For the convex-concave function U('\, h) defined above there exists a saddle point 
('\'", h*) and 
m = maxminU('\,h) = U('\*,h*) = min maxU('\, h). hEH "EA AEA hEH 
In particular, the LOP holds on the market Mp,a if and only if the function U('\, h) possesses a 
saddle point at (0, h) for every h EH. 
In game theoretic terminology the equality in the above Theorem expresses a two-person zero-sum 
game of the investor against the "market". Since '\i = Pi - JK O:i dp could be interpreted as the 
error commited by the "market" in the price of each asset for the state prices p, the sum L:i:l hi,\j 
would be the payment from the "market" to the investor due to hand ,\. Thus, the investor chooses 
a priced one portfolio of short-selling bounds in such a way that it maximizes the minimal payment 
desired by the "market" and solves maXhEH minAEA U('\, h). The problem, minAEA maXhEH U('\, h) 
describes the process by \vhich the "market" counteracts the goal of the investor by choosing the 
feasible ,\ (i.e., the feasible implicit state prices p) which minimizes the maximal payment desired 
by the investor. 
Proposition 9 yields another optimization problem to find out the value of m in practical 
situations. 
Proposition 9 Suppose the LOP does not hold on the market and consider the following optimiza-
tion problem 
n 




i) The optimal value in (7) is ~. 
r <I>(h) ~ 1 h· > 0 '- i = 1,· ··n 
ii) The minimum in (7) is achieved for h if and only if the maximum in (5) is achieved for mho 
Note that Lemma 5 ensures that <I> is the minimum of some finite number of linear functions. 
Therefore, the inequality constraint <I>(h) 2 1 may be replaced by a finite number of linear inequality 
constraints and, Problem (7) is just a finite-dimensional linear program which can be solved by the 
classical optimization techniques. 
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4 Other representations of the disagreeluent measure. 
In the previous sections we defined the disagreement measure to be the maximum achieved in 
the optimization problem (5), which represents the maximum profit with short-selling restrictions, 
stocks for example, with total current price one. With the aid of some lemmas, we can also express 
the disagreement measure in two alternative ways. First, the measure represents the maximum 
profit obtained from a portfolio relative to the price of the sold assets. Second, we establish a 
relation between the disagreement measure and the maximum profit obtained from a portfolio 
relative to the price of all exchanged (sold and purchased) assets. This relation could be useful to 
study arbitrage opportunities in economies with frictions. Proceeding in a similar way to Prisman 
it might be possible to establish conditions to detect the fulfillment of the LOP in economies with 
frictions and read apt the disagreement measure to consider these frictions. 
Lemma 10 Given a market Mp,a, let h* E Hand x* E Fho verifying (6), and suppose <jJ(h*) > O. 
Then 
i) xi = -hi or hi = 0 (or both) for every j = 1", ·n. 
ii) In particular, if xi > -hi then xi > o. 
Lemma 10 ii) says basically that the portfolio where the maximum profit is achieved either sells all 
the stock or purchases in each asset. 
For a portfolio x E IRn, denote by Sx the set of indices of the sold assets and by Lx the set of 
indices of the purchased assets, that is, Sx = {i = 1,' .. n I Xi < O} and Lx = {i = 1,' .. n I Xi ~ O}. 
Theorem 11 Assume the existence of a portfolio x E IRn such that 
n n 
L XiPi < 0 and L XiD:i(k) = 0 
i=1 i=1 
for every k E J(. Then 
i) There exists i E {I, 2,,' ·n} such that Xi < O. 
n 
LXiPi 





iii) If x = X* then i=1 = cp(h*). 
L XiPi 
Theorem 11 proves that when LOP fails X* solves the following optimization problem 
Maximize 
- L XiPi 
(8) iESx 
I t XiD:i(k) = 0 for every k E J( subject to i~1 LXiPi < 0 i=1 
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and </>(h*) is then the objective optimal value. 
This result is mathematically interesting by itself, because it solves an optimization problem with 
strict inequality constraints and a non differentiable objective. Furthermore, it gives another repre-
sentation of the disagreement measure in a market without short-selling restrictions as the maximum 
profit obtained from a portfolio with total sold assets price one. (Observe that 
is a homogeneous function of degree zero and for every feasible x, kx is also feasible for every 
k> 0.) 
Theorem 11 yields some important properties. The complete relaxation of the constraints 
imposed to the short positions leads to the same measure m. Hence, an agent can replicate his/her 
portfolio in an arbitrary way and m still tests the maximum relative profit over the total price of 
the sold assets. Choosing a portfolio x where this maximum profit is achieved, we can deduce from 
Lemma 10 how must one choose h* and take into account short-selling restrictions. That is, 
hi = 0 if Xi ~ 0 and hi = LXi if Xi < O. 
XiPi 
ieS" 
Consider now for every portfolio X =j: 0 the function 
(9) 
The function g(x) is the quotient between the profit generated by the zero payoff X and the price 
of all interchanged assets. Manipulating g(x), it is easy to prove that 
f(x) 
g(x) = 2 _ f(x) for every x E IRn such that L XiPi =j: O. 
ies" 
These observations and the fact that 2:t is a increasing continuous function in [0, 1] (0 ~ m ~ 1) 
lead to the following theorem. 
Theorem 12 Let m> 0 and consider h* E Hand x* such that 
m= 
Then, x'" solves the following optimization problem 
Maximize g(x) 
{ 




for every k E I< 
We have then proved that problem (10) is solvable when the LOP does not hold on the market. 
Obviously, if the LOP holds on the market and (10) is feasible then g(x) = 0 for every feasible x in 
(10) and, (10) is also solvable (the optimal value is then zero.) Denoting by 1 the optimal solution 
in (10), we get from (9) 
(11) * f(x*) rn 1 = g(x ) = 2 _ f(x*) = 2 - rn' 
The relation 1 = 2~m remains true when the LOP holds on the market. Thus, I is also a measure 
of the degree of discrepancy of prices. It is also a relative measure which takes values in [0, 1] and 
such that I ~ rn, since 0 ~ rn ~ 1. 
In this case the measure I computes the maximum profit relative to the total price of the 
exchanged assets. Thus, it could be tested if the market frictions affect to the fulfillment of the 
LOP. In fact, the transaction costs can be discounted and it is possible to verify if there still are 
arbitrage opportunities. 
The results in this section guarantee that the measures rn and 1 do not depend on the short-
selling restrictions imposed in order to avoid mathematical difficulties. In fact, from the most 
constrained conditions, where no initial short positions are permitted, and the agents cannot sell 
what they do not have, to the most relaxed ones where there are no restrictions in each asset to be 
sold, the same portfolio x* implements the relative arbitrage profits. Note that in the first case, an 
agent needs an initial portfolio proportional to h* in order to win the relative profit rn, while this 
relative profit is available to any agent in the second case. For intermediate situations (short-selling 
restrictions for some assets but no short-selling restrictions for the remaining ones), the same values 
for rn, I and x* would be obtained, although in that case not all the investors would be able to win 
these maximum relative profits. 
5 Applications to financial luarket integration 
Chen and Knez (1995) develop a measurement theory of market integration for two markets when-
ever there exist discrepancies in pricing common asset payoffs or, equivalently, when the LOP is 
violated across them. They assume the LOP holds separately on each market and use a model 
slightly different to ours: they consider the linear space of square-integrable random variables L2 
over a probality space (n, F, PR) instead of C(K). Readapting it to the mathematical setting of 
this paper, they define what they call the weak-integration measure g(M b A1 2) as the minimum 
distance between the sets of state prices 
D1 = {Il E M(K) I j~. ai dll = Pi i = l""Q} 
and 
D2 = {Il E M(I{) I /\. ai dll = Pi i = q + 1, ... n} 
where .A11 = A1pl,al, .;\.12 = Mp2,a2, pI = (PI""Pq), 0:'1 = (O:'I""O:'q) p2 = (Pq+1,"'Pn) and 
0'2 = (aq+l," ·an ). Thus, 
g(M 1 ,A12) = inf{ll/lI -ll21111l1 E Dl,1l2 E D2}. 
Chen and Knez (199.5) also prove that the weak integration measure equals the maximum difference 
between the respective prices assigned by both markets to any unit-norm payoff. 
The measure m is an alternative to the weak-integration measure. Treating both markets 
M1 and A12 as parts of the combined market Mp,en where P = (PI," 'Pq,Pq+1" 'Pn) and a = 
10 
(al," ·aq, aq+l" . an), we compute m on this global market. Thus, Theorem 13 reveals that m is 
continuous with respect to g(MI, M2)' and gives an upper bound for m which depends only on 
the returns of the different assets available on each market. 
Theorem 13 The following inequalities hold. I 
i) I;:; m;:; t Ila~"g(A,1t,M2) 
j=l PJ 
ii) I;:; m;:; t lIa~lIg(MI,M2) 
j=q+l PJ 
iii) I < m < ~ ~ lI a jllg(M M) 
- -2L...J. 11 2 
j=l PJ 
Theorem 13 iii) remains true for any division of the combined market into two markets in such a way 
that the assets in each group satisfy the LOP. Note that m can be computed even if both markets 
do not separately verify the LOP. Hence, m reflects a degree of integration of two or more markets 
verifying the LOP or not. Chen and Knez (1995) propose to divide those markets violating the 
LOP into smaller groups, so that the LOP holds separately on each group and to measure among 
them. But the value of the weak-integration measure depends on the way in which each market 
violating the LOP is divided. The examples below illustrate this fact. 
Example 1. Consider the case where there are two possible states of nature, 81 and 82. Suppose 
one asset Al paying $ 1 in 81 and $ 0 in 82 with a current price of $ 1, another asset A2 paying $ 
o in 81 and $ 1 in 82, with a current price of $ 1, and a third one A3 paying $ 1 in 81 and $ a in 82 
with a current price of $ P (p> 0). 
Direct calculations solving (.5) or (7) show that for M = {A 1,A2,A3} the disagreement measure is 
given by 
11 + a - pi 
m= --~------~--~ 
max{l + a,p,p- a) 
We compute 9 for some of the different ways of dividing the market M into two markets so that 
the LOP holds separately on each market. 
i) For M1 = {AI, A2} and M2 = {A3} we get g(M 1,M2) = 1~~::31. 
ii) For SI = {Ad and S2 = {A2, A3} we get g(Sl,S2) = 11 + a - pi. 
iii) For NI = {A2} and N2 = {AI, A3} (note that we need a =1= 0, or p = 1 if a = 0) we get 
g(N1,N2) = 11i~IPI if a =1= 0 and g(N1,N2) = 0 otherwise. 
iv) For 111 = {A1,A3} and 112 = {A2,A3} and the same assumptions for a and p as in iii) we 
get g(1lI, 1l2) = 11i~IPI (VI + ( 2) if a =1= 0 and g(1l1, 1l2) = 0 otherwise. 
This shows that the weak-integration measure 9 depends on the way in which the market M is 
divided. If we compare the results obtained in ii) and iii) for a fixed price p, we observe that 
This is due to the fact that the weak-integration measure computes the differences between the 
respective prices assigned to any unit-norm payoff in both markets, that is, the maximum profit 
obtained among all the portfolios with a zero payoff which can be expressed by the difference 
1 Readapting our model to Chen and Knez's model, the same inequalities would be obtained writing I/O' j 112 instead 
of 1/0)1/ for every j = 1,," n where lIo)lI~ = In 0; dPR. 
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between two unit norm common payoffs. 
Thus, the measure m presents some advantages with respect to g. First, m is not refered to the 
unit-norm payoff, but to the portfolios with sold assets total price one, a fact which seems to be 
more interesting for the investor. Furthermore, in computing m it is necessary to consider all 
the available portfolios in the combined market and not only the ones expressed by the difference 
between two unit-norm common payoffs in both markets. 
Example 2. Consider the case where there are two possible states of nature, SI and S2. Suppose 
one asset Al paying $1 in both states and with current price of $1, another asset A2 paying $1 + a 
in SI and $1 - a in S2 with a current price of $1, and a third one A3 paying $1 + 2a in SI and 
$1 - a in S2 with a current price of $I. 
Dividing the market M into the markets 31 = {AI, A2} and 32 = {AI, A3} we get 
g(31' 32) = V; if a i= 0 
and g(311 32) = 0 if a = 0 
First, note that both markets verify the LOP, and also that no arbitrage opportunity exists in each 
market, in the sense that there are no positive payoffs with negative or zero prices, since for each 
market there exists a positive state price. Second, the weak-integration measure is not continuous 
in a. Intuitively, for both markets 31 and 32, the closer to 0 the value of a, the more closely 
integrated the two markets are (that is, the lmver the minimum initial investment needed across 
the combined market to purchase a portfolio with total price of the sold assets one and generating 
a zero payoff in every state of nature). Direct calculations show that for M = {AI, A2 , A3} and 
a E [0, 1) the value of m is ~, which is continuous in a. As already said, m is the maximum 
profit relative to the market price of all the sold assets an investor can obtain. For instance, if we 
take a = 0.3, then m = 0.1, which shows that the maximum profit obtained from all the possible 
portfolios is the 10% of the total price of the sold assets. 
'''le conclude from the two examples above that m avoids some of the problems encountered 
when using the measure proposed by Chen and Knez(199.5). First, imagine in Example 2 that an 
error in the measurement process provides a very small, but strictly positive, instead of a = O. 
The weak-integration measure reflects that the maximum squared difference between the respective 
prices assigned by both markets to any unit-norm common payoff is ~. Nevertheless, if a = 0 
the LOP holds across both markets and this difference is zero. Thus, the discontinuity of the 
weak-integration measure 9 makes it very sensitive \vith respect to measurement errors in empirical 
applications. This problem disappears when working with m. Clearly, m is very small if a is small 
enough. 
Second, the weak-integration measure can not be applied if one of the two markets does not verify 
the LOP. Chen and Knez(199.5) suggest in such a case to divide the market violating the LOP in 
sub-markets, so that the LOP holds on each group. However, this presents serious problems, since, 
as we have seen in Example 1, their measure is also very sensitive to the way in which each market 
is divided into sub-markets. Again, m solves this problem because it is computed in the global 
market and so, it does not depend on the initial markets and only on the combined one. 
Finally, and maybe most importantly, m gives an information in monetary terms, namely either the 
maximum profits relative to the market price of the portfolio h of short-selling restrictions under 
the most constrained conditions, or maximum profits relative to the market price of the sold assets 
if there are no restrictions at all. 
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6 Conclusions 
This paper presents two measures (m and l) of the degree of fulfillment of the Law of One Price 
(LOP) in a financial market. These measures are related by (11) and vanish if and only the LOP 
holds on the market. When the LOP does not hold on the market, the measures are strictly 
positive, and they increase if the level of violation of the LOP increases, that is, when there is an 
increase in the profit that an investor can obtain relative to the total amount of money he/she has 
to exchange replicating his/her portfolio and implementing the arbitrage. The maximum value of 
these measures is one, and it is attained in extreme situations in which the agents can replicate 
their portfolios in such a way that they obtain a profit equal to the price of the sold assets. This 
is a limiting case which will never appear in practical situations. 
The measures do not depend on the short-selling restrictions in the model. We may assume 
either that the agents cannot replicate by selling the assets they do not have, or the opposite, that 
is, there is no limit on the short positions the agents can hold. In both cases the same values for 
both measures are obtained. 
The LOP is usually characterized by the existence of state prices, but this is a very specific 
criterium which only determines the accomplishment or not of the LOP. A measure able to reflect 
the degree of fulfillment, that is, the discrepancy in pricing the assets, makes the model more 
flexible, and therefore, more realistic. If the measure is strictly positive and small enough, we are 
most likely to have an efficient market, although either the trading frictions and transaction costs, 
or the measurement errors may lead to this positive value. 
Our measures also allow us to analyze markets with frictions. In fact, since they quantify the 
degree of fulfillment of the LOP in (relative) monetary terms, once we have computed them we 
can discount the transaction costs and, therefore, we may know if the agents can implement the 
arbitrage opportunities. 
:\Iany empirical papers analyze some well-known specific arbitrage strategies. Our measures 
have the important advantage that in computing them, all the assets in the market are selected 
and, therefore, all the arbitrage opportunities are considered. 
The measures here introduced do not depend on the dynamic assumptions applied to price the 
assets. 
In considering several financial markets, one can work in a global market collecting all the 
available assets from the (sub)markets. Then m and I (computed on the combined market) may be 
taken to measure the integration of all them. These new market integration measures are continuous 
with respect to the Ch en and Knez measure g, so estimating and controlling their measure, our 
measures are also controlled. The opposite is in general false, and there are situations in which 
m takes small values while 9 remains large. This is an important fact, once one realizes that m 
is qualitatively different from g, since it measures in monetary terms (relative profits available 
by the agents). Furthermore, m seems to be more suited to estimate the degree of multimarket 
integration: first, it is never insensitive to the arbitrage opportunities (see Example 2). Second, it 
does not need that each market verifies the LOP. Finally, the value of m does not depend upon the 
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way in which each market is divided into submarkets. 
The theory developed above analyzes the degree of fulfillment or violation of the LOP in a 
financial market or across different ones, but it may also be extended to reflect the level of arbitrage 
opportunities in the strong form (or cross-market arbitrage). 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 2. See Chamberlain and Rothschild(1983). 
Proof of Lemma 3. Taking into account the remarks after Lemma 3, it only remains to prove that 
(2) holds. In fact, since x* E Fh, we have xi ~ -hj for every j = 1,··· n. Besides, the optimal 
value in (lh) is greater than 0, since the zero vector is in Fh. Combining these two facts, (2) is 
easily derived. 
Proof of Lemma 4. In the inequality -constrained program (lh), x E IRn and the associated positive 
cone P is IRn, while the inequality constraints take values in C(K) x IRn, where the associated 
positive cone Q is {O} x \Rn. 
P is a cone with compact sole (since B = {x E IRn IlIxll = I} is a compact set in P such that 0 is 
not in Band B spans P.) Besides, if x E IRn is such that (- 2::::£=1 xiai, x) E Q and 2::::£=1 XiPi = 0 
then x = o. 
These two facts allow us to ensure that 
is a closed set (see Theorem 3.19 of Anderson and Nash(1987). Now, from Theorems 3.10 and 
3.22 (Anderson and Nash(1987), Lemma 3 is deduced. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Lemma 4 ensures that 1>(h) is the optimal value of (4h). Denoting by T the 
linear map T(p) = (fn:aidp)i=1 from M(K) to IRn, it follows that T(M(K» is a vector space in 
IRn. So, the feasible set in (4h) is the intersection between P - T(M (K)) and IR+. Therefore, there 
exists only a finite number of extreme points AI, A2 ... Ar for this feasible set which do not depend 
on h, since the feasible set does not depend on h. Then 
and the proof is concluded. 
Proof of Theorem 7. Just observe that the LOP holds on the market if and only if 2::::£=1 XiPi = 0 
whenever 2:£=1 Xiai(k) = 0 for every k E K or, equivalently, if 1>(h) = 0 for every h E IR+. But 
taking into account that 1> is homogeneous of degree one, the latter is equivalent to m = O. 
Proof of Theorem 8. For every A E A, denote 
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Since H is a compact set, such a maximum exists. Moreover, the maximum is achieved for some 
extreme point Ai(O,"', _pI, •• ·0), and then f(>..) = max( ~p'\ '~p'\ ••• k). Hence f is a continuous 
I I 2 pn 
function. Since f(>..) ~ </l(h) for every>.. E A and hE H, the function </l is a bounded. Thus, there 
exists /3 = inf{f(>..) I >.. EA}. 
Note that H and A are convex subsets, H is a compact set, U(>..,.) is quasiconcave and upper-
semicontinuous for every>.. E A, and U(., h) is quasiconvex and below-semicontinuous for every 
hE H. Hence Sion's theorem (Moulin(I979)) yields 
(3 = inf{J{>..) I >.. E A} = max{</l{h) I hE H}. 
It only remains to prove that such an infimum is achieved for some >.. * E A. To do this, take 
a sequence (>..k)bl in A such that f(>..k) < /3 + t for every k. Then f(>..k) < /3 + 1 and since 
,\k,\k k f(>..k) = max(:..:l.,···,:..:.I1.) it follows that >"i < Pi (/3 + 1) for every k E IN and i E {I, 2·· .n}. Thus, PI Pn (>..k)k::l is a bounded sequence in IRf. and, consequently, there exists a subsequence converging to 
>"*, which we denote also by (>..k)k::l' Since A is a closed set, we have >"* E A. From the continuity of 
f and the choice of the sequence (>..k)k::l' the inequality f(>..*) ~ /3 is derived and, then, f(>..*) = (3. 
Taking now h* E H such that </l(h*) = f(>..*), it follows that (>..*, h*) is a saddle point for U and, 
therefore, Theorem 8 is already proved. 
Proof of Lemma 10. ii) is easily deduced from i). Let us prove i). 
In order to simplify the notation and without loss of generality, we wiII prove i) for j = n. 
Proceeding by contradiction, suppose x~ > -h~, and h~ > O. 
n-l 
First, assume x~ ~ 0, and let ho = (hi,"" h~_l' 0) and I = L pjhi. It is easily proved that 
i=l 
o < I < 1. Besides </l(ho) ~ </l(h*), since the feasible sets Fho and Fh* are such that Fho ~ Fh*. 
From X* E Fho we get </l(h*) = </l(ho). Finally, we have 
where the last inequality follows from the fact that ~ho E H. Since (Ad leads to a contradiction, 
the proof is concluded whenever x~ ~ O. 
n-l 
Assume now -h~ < x~ < 0 and let hO = (hi,"" h~_l' Ix~1) and 0 = L Pihi + Pnlx~l. As above, 
i=l 
we get 0 < 0 < 1 and 
</l(h*) = </l(hO) = O</l(}hO) < </l(}hO) ~ </l(h*) , 
which concludes the proof of Lemma 10. 
Proof of Theorem 11 i) It follows from the fact that L£:l XiPi ~ 0 whenever Xi ~ 0 for every 
iE{I,2···n}. 
n 
ii) Let h' = (h~, h~··· h~), where hi = max( -J,"j, 0) for every i = 1"" n, and c = LPihi = 
i=l 
- L XiPi > O. 
iES., 
Since ~h' E H we get </l(~h') = ~</l(h') ~ </l{h*). 
n 
Besides, from x E Fh' we get - LPiXj ~ </l{h'). 
i=l 
1.5 
Thus, combining both inequalities, ii) is proved. 
n 
iii) Assume x = x". Then <p(h*) = - L xipi' From Lemma 10 we get xi = -hi whenever i E Sx* 
i=1 
and hi = 0 otherwise. Thus, 
n 
- L xipi = L hipi = L hipi = 1 
iES",* iES",* i=1 
and the proof of iii) is concluded. 
Proof of Theorem 13. Proofs of i) and ii) are similar, and iii) is an easy consequence of i) and ii). 
So, we will just prove i). 
Let h* E H, x" E Fh' such that 
n 
m = <p(h") = - I: xipi . 
i=1 





(3h o ) { n L XiO:i(k) = 0 for every k E K subject to i=1 (3i ~ Xi ~ -hi i = 1,···n 
where 
1 - Pihi 1 
----'- = - - h* . 
Pi Pi • 





n 1 n 2:) -: - hi),xi + L hi,xt 
i=1 P. i=1 
{ IK O:i dJ.l -,xi +,x; = Pi Xi- > 0 ,x~ > 0 i = 1 ···n and 11 E M(I{) 1 _ , 1 _ , r'subject to 
1+ = {i E {1,2,···n} I Pi - f O:idJ.l ~ O} iK 
r={iE{1,2···n} IPi- f O:idJ.l<O}, iK 
problem (A2h.) can be reformulated as 
Minimize I: (~- hi) ( f. O:i dll - Pi) + L hi (Pi - f. O:i dJ.l) 
iEI- P. if: iEI+ if: 
subject to It E M(K) 
and then, 
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Now, set 9 = g(MbM2) and let £ > o. Choose III E Dl and 112 E D2 such that 
Then, 
9 ~ ":;,,IL <Yj dill -1 <Yj dllzl- £ 
for every i = 1,·· ·n. Since IK <Yj dill = Pj for j = 1,·· .q, we then have 
for every j = 1,·· .q. Denoting 
J+ = {j E {1,2,···q} I Pj - L <Yj dll2 ~ O} 
and 
J- = {j E {1,2···q} I Pj - L <Yj dll2 < A}, 
we multiply (As) by hj for every j E J+, and by ;J - hj for every j E J-. Adding up all the 
obtained inequalities, we get 
where A = L lI<Yjllhj + L lI<Yj 11 ( ~ - hj). Since hi ~ 0 and t -hj ~ 0 for every i = 1,2·· .q, 
jEJ+ jEJ- PJ 
it follows that 
Besides, from the fact that JK <Yi dll2 = Pi for every i = q + 1,·· ·n, we obtain that 
From (.44 ), (A6 ), (Ai), and (A8) it follows that 
and then, Theorem 11 i) is proved. 
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